Week 39

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether the candidate can distinguish strategic autonomy from neutrality, isolation or reflexive anti-Westernism.

How to take it

Begin by define it as the capacity to take decisions based on national interest rather than external compulsion. Explain that it requires diversified partnerships and domestic capability, not equal distance from every country. Concede that autonomy has limits when economic and technological dependencies are high, then land on practical diversification.

A strong answer sounds like

I understand strategic autonomy as India’s capacity to make foreign-policy choices independently, guided by its national interest and constitutional commitment to peace, rather than by pressure from any power bloc. It does not mean neutrality in every conflict, nor does it mean keeping equal distance from all countries. India can deepen cooperation with the United States and other partners while maintaining channels with Russia where our interests require it. The strongest counter-argument is that sanctions can create real costs for Indian firms, finance and defence supplies, so autonomy cannot be only a slogan. My administrative judgement would be to reduce single-country dependence, maintain diplomatic engagement with all sides, and take each commercial or strategic decision after a clear assessment of India’s security and economic exposure.

Expect next

• Can strategic autonomy survive dependence on imported defence equipment?
• Is India being principled or merely opportunistic?

What they are testing

The panel wants to assess judgement on international law, commercial risk and the difference between principle and prudence.

How to take it

Lead with the distinction between multilateral sanctions and unilateral measures. State that Indian policy should be governed by Indian law, international obligations and national interest, while firms must realistically assess exposure to foreign financial systems. Concede that ignoring risk can harm Indian entities, and conclude with lawful risk management rather than political posturing.

A strong answer sounds like

India should not automatically treat another country’s unilateral sanctions as binding on India. Our position should rest on Indian law, our international obligations and a careful assessment of national interest. At the same time, I would not advise Indian companies to dismiss such sanctions casually, because access to international banking, insurance, technology and markets can be affected even when India does not formally endorse the measure. The counter-argument is that excessive caution can make India appear to surrender its policy space without a formal decision. I would therefore separate the political position from commercial risk management: India should retain its independent diplomatic stance, while the government gives firms clear guidance to avoid avoidable legal and financial disruption and to build alternative capacities over time.

Expect next

• Would you support United Nations sanctions in every case?
• How should small Indian exporters handle this uncertainty?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether the candidate can convert a foreign-policy principle into coordinated administrative action.

How to take it

Start with a whole-of-government risk assessment covering energy, payments, shipping, insurance and critical imports. Link it to consumer welfare and macroeconomic stability, especially amid global oil disruptions. Concede that secrecy and speed may be necessary in diplomacy, but insist on institutional coordination and contingency planning.

A strong answer sounds like

My first step would be a coordinated assessment of India’s exposure, rather than an ideological response. External Affairs, Petroleum, Finance, Commerce, the financial regulators and relevant security agencies would need a common picture of risks to energy supplies, shipping, insurance, payments, defence maintenance and Indian businesses. This matters because global disruptions can quickly become domestic inflation and supply problems; this week’s reporting on fuel-price pressures and the Strait of Hormuz underlines that connection. The counter-argument is that such coordination can become slow and bureaucratic during a crisis. I would address that through a standing inter-ministerial mechanism with pre-approved contingency options. My administrative judgement is that resilience comes from preparation, diversified sourcing and credible communication with industry, not last-minute reactions.

Expect next

• Would diversification make energy imports more expensive?
• Who should lead this inter-ministerial mechanism?

What they are testing

The panel is probing whether the candidate can hold moral concerns and national interest together without using either as an excuse.

How to take it

Acknowledge the human cost of war and affirm the importance of sovereignty, dialogue and international law. Explain that diplomatic engagement need not imply endorsement of every action by a partner. Concede that silence can damage credibility, then conclude that India should use engagement to press for de-escalation while protecting vital interests.

A strong answer sounds like

I do not think ethical foreign policy requires India to sever engagement whenever it disagrees with another state’s conduct. The human cost of the war in Ukraine and the importance of sovereignty are serious concerns, and India should consistently support dialogue, de-escalation and respect for international law. However, continued engagement with Russia does not automatically amount to approval of all Russian actions. India has legitimate interests in energy security, defence preparedness and regional stability, and isolating a major power may not necessarily advance peace. The strongest criticism is that a purely interest-based approach can look morally selective and weaken India’s credibility. My judgement would be to combine principled public support for peaceful resolution with sustained diplomatic contact, while ensuring that India’s essential security and economic interests are not exposed to sudden coercion.

Expect next

• Should India publicly criticise Russia more directly?
• Can national interest ever justify moral silence?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can translate an international security development into economic and administrative consequences without exaggerating facts.

How to take it

Begin with the Strait as a strategically important maritime passage and explain the channels of transmission: supply uncertainty, freight and insurance costs, and market expectations. Concede that governments cannot control a conflict or global prices. Land on preparedness through reliable monitoring, diversified options and protection of essential services rather than panic-driven decisions.

A strong answer sounds like

I would see it as a domestic governance issue because disruption at a major sea passage can quickly become uncertainty in fuel availability and cost. The impact is not limited to whether a ship is physically delayed; rerouting, insurance costs and market sentiment can also place pressure on households, transport and public services. India cannot determine the course of a West Asian conflict, and it would be wrong to claim that every price movement is caused by one event. But government can prepare better by continuously assessing supply exposure, maintaining contingency arrangements, communicating honestly and prioritising essential services. My administrative judgement would be to treat energy security as everyday economic resilience, not merely as foreign-policy rhetoric.

Expect next

• What information would you seek before announcing any response?
• Should fuel prices fully reflect a sudden external shock?

What they are testing

The panel is testing strategic judgement: whether you can distinguish principled diplomacy from alignment driven by immediate commercial anxiety.

How to take it

Lead with India’s interest in de-escalation, freedom of navigation and protection of civilians and commerce. Acknowledge that stronger alignment may appear to offer short-term leverage or security assurances. Conclude that durable energy security comes from diplomatic room for manoeuvre, engagement with all relevant parties and reduced vulnerability, not reflexive camp politics.

A strong answer sounds like

I would support a clear position on principles, but not a reflexive alignment with any camp. India should consistently favour de-escalation, safety of commercial navigation and peaceful resolution, because a prolonged disruption harms importing countries and vulnerable consumers far beyond the region. The strongest counter-argument is that taking a sharper side may seem to secure immediate access or security support from a powerful partner. Yet such gains can be uncertain and may narrow India’s ability to engage the various actors needed during a crisis. In my view, strategic autonomy is not neutrality in the face of disruption; it is the capacity to speak clearly, engage widely and protect national interests without becoming dependent on one political alignment.

Expect next

• Can strategic autonomy become an excuse for moral ambiguity?
• What should India say publicly if shipping safety deteriorates further?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can convert a macroeconomic shock into an operational, citizen-facing administrative response.

How to take it

Start with a verified situation assessment, not an announcement: supplies, delivery schedules, critical users and local price behaviour. Concede that a state administration cannot set international oil prices or solve national supply constraints. End with coordinated action on essential-service continuity, anti-profiteering enforcement, targeted communication and reporting to the Union government.

A strong answer sounds like

My first step would be to establish a verified picture of local vulnerability: the status of fuel supplies, expected deliveries, availability for hospitals, public transport, emergency services and essential goods movement, and any abnormal retail behaviour. I would avoid creating panic through dramatic public messaging. A state administration cannot control global prices or substitute for national energy policy, and broad controls can themselves distort supply. But it can coordinate distributors and district authorities, ensure priority access for essential services, act against hoarding or misleading claims, and communicate realistic information to citizens. My administrative judgement would be to protect continuity and fairness first, while giving the Union government prompt field feedback on emerging shortages or price stress.

Expect next

• Would you impose purchase limits at retail outlets?
• How would you distinguish hoarding from normal precautionary buying?

What they are testing

The panel is testing your ability to balance compassion, fiscal responsibility and long-term incentives rather than offering an easy populist answer.

How to take it

State that cushioning hardship is legitimate, especially where essential mobility and livelihoods are affected, but universal insulation is neither fiscally neutral nor necessarily equitable. Recognise the opposing case that visible price rises can hurt poor households immediately and fuel inflation. Conclude in favour of transparent, temporary and targeted relief alongside efficiency and public transport measures.

A strong answer sounds like

No, I would not argue that governments should shield every consumer from every increase, because universal price suppression can become expensive, opaque and regressive when better-off users receive the same benefit as vulnerable households. At the same time, allowing an abrupt external shock to pass through without support can hurt workers, small businesses and essential transport, and may widen inflationary pressure. The strongest argument for broad relief is that fuel affects many prices and hardship is immediate. My preference would be transparent, temporary and targeted cushioning for genuinely vulnerable uses, while protecting public transport and essential services. Administratively, the test is whether relief reaches need without weakening fiscal capacity or discouraging longer-term energy efficiency.

Expect next

• How would you identify vulnerable users without creating a complex new scheme?
• Would targeted relief risk excluding deserving households?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether the candidate can distinguish strategic autonomy from economic isolation.

How to take it

Start by defining self-reliance as the capacity to make choices under pressure, not the absence of trade. Concede that open trade lowers costs and can support exports, but explain why concentrated dependence in critical sectors is a risk. Land on diversified supply chains and domestic capability as the practical middle path.

A strong answer sounds like

I would not equate self-reliance with refusing to trade with China or with any country. For me, it means that India should retain the capacity to take sovereign decisions even when a trading partner applies economic pressure. Trade can lower costs, expand consumer choice and help Indian firms access markets; this week’s reporting on exports to core BRICS markets shows that China can also matter as an export destination. The strongest counter-argument is that efforts to reduce dependence can raise costs and protect inefficient firms. That is valid. So India should not pursue autarky. My administrative judgement would be to identify genuinely critical dependencies, build competitive domestic capacity there, and diversify suppliers elsewhere while remaining engaged in trade.

Expect next

• How would you decide which imports are genuinely critical?
• Can diversification simply shift dependence from China to another country?

What they are testing

The panel is testing judgement under the competing demands of security, inflation, industry and diplomacy.

How to take it

Take a clear position against indiscriminate restrictions while accepting that security concerns can justify targeted action. Explain that a measure should be evidence-based, proportionate and periodically reviewed. End by connecting trade policy with resilience rather than political signalling.

A strong answer sounds like

I would not support broad restrictions merely because goods originate in China. A blanket approach may raise prices for households and industries, disrupt inputs for Indian manufacturers, and invite retaliation against Indian exports. However, national security cannot be treated as a commercial inconvenience. Where a product, technology or supply chain creates a credible strategic vulnerability, India can use targeted safeguards, procurement standards or alternative sourcing. The difficult part is preventing security from becoming a vague excuse for permanent protectionism. I would require a clear risk assessment, transparent criteria and a review period for any restriction. My administrative judgement would be to use trade measures selectively, alongside investment in Indian capability, so that security policy improves resilience rather than simply increasing costs.

Expect next

• Who should conduct the risk assessment for such restrictions?
• What would you do if a critical alternative is much more expensive?

What they are testing

The panel wants to see whether the candidate can translate a national strategy into implementable administration.

How to take it

Begin with diagnosis rather than announcing incentives: map the input, users, substitutes and disruption risks. Concede that domestic production cannot be created by subsidy alone and needs standards, skills, finance and reliable demand. Conclude with measurable, time-bound support and an exit discipline.

A strong answer sounds like

I would first establish exactly where the vulnerability lies, because importing a product is not automatically a strategic problem. I would map the critical input, the industries dependent on it, feasible alternative suppliers, domestic technological capability and the consequences of a disruption. I would then support Indian producers through predictable standards, testing facilities, skill development and demand conditions that reward quality rather than just local origin. The strongest objection is that this can become subsidy for inefficient businesses at public cost. I agree that it can, if support is open-ended. Therefore, I would make assistance time-bound and review whether firms are becoming competitive in quality, reliability and price. My administrative judgement would be to build an ecosystem, not merely replace one imported item with a costly domestic one.

Expect next

• How would you prevent local-content rules from encouraging poor quality?
• Would you involve State governments in this industrial mapping?

What they are testing

The panel is probing the candidate’s ethical framework for balancing consumer welfare, livelihoods and national capability.

How to take it

Recognise that both consumers and producers include vulnerable citizens, so the issue cannot be framed as patriotism versus affordability. State a preference for fair competition and targeted transition support over permanent consumer sacrifice. Close by explaining that the state must be candid about costs and distributional effects.

A strong answer sounds like

I would not treat consumers and producers as opposing moral categories, because both include ordinary Indian families. Cheaper imports can matter greatly to a low-income household, while sudden import competition can threaten the livelihood of a worker or small manufacturer. My position is that the government should protect fair competition and strategic capability, but it should not ask consumers to bear indefinitely higher prices for inefficient production. The strongest counter-argument is that cheap imports can permanently damage an industry before it gets a fair chance to mature. That is why temporary, carefully justified support may be necessary, especially where capability has strategic value. My administrative judgement would be to make the trade-off transparent, protect workers during adjustment, and demand performance from firms receiving protection.

Expect next

• How long should temporary protection last?
• Would you compensate consumers for higher prices during the transition?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can distinguish legitimate financial regulation from an indiscriminate suspicion of civil society.

How to take it

Begin by recognise that money can shape public influence, so disclosure and lawful oversight are legitimate. Then separate regulation of funds from judgement about an organisation’s viewpoint or criticism of government. Land on predictable, proportionate and even-handed compliance as the democratic standard.

A strong answer sounds like

I see regulation of foreign funding as legitimate because financial flows can influence public priorities, advocacy and even public confidence. The state has a duty to know who funds organisations working in sensitive social and public-policy spaces, and to prevent diversion or concealed influence. But I would not equate foreign support with disloyalty. Many civil-society groups bring specialised knowledge, reach communities that administration may miss, and raise uncomfortable but useful feedback. The stronger concern is that lightly regulated money can distort local priorities or evade accountability. Therefore, my position is that scrutiny should be rigorous, transparent and applied uniformly, while compliance processes remain clear enough that lawful public-interest work is not treated as a favour.

Expect next

• Would the same standard apply to foreign funding of think tanks and universities?
• How would you define proportionate scrutiny in practice?

What they are testing

The panel is testing your commitment to constitutional democracy when criticism is inconvenient to the executive.

How to take it

Lead with the principle that compliance and political agreement are different questions. Concede that speech cannot shield financial wrongdoing or threats to public order. Conclude that decisions must rest on recorded, reviewable legal grounds rather than perceived ideological alignment.

A strong answer sounds like

No, criticism by itself should not affect funding permission if the organisation is complying with the applicable law. A democracy gains when policies are tested by evidence, affected communities and independent voices; an administration can learn from criticism even when its tone is uncomfortable. At the same time, I would not give any organisation immunity because it claims to be a rights group or a public-interest body. If there is diversion of funds, concealment, fraud or another demonstrable violation, action should follow. The key distinction is between disagreement with government and illegality by an organisation. As an administrator, I would insist that any adverse decision be based on specific evidence, communicated through reasons, and capable of fair review rather than on the organisation’s public position.

Expect next

• Can criticism ever become a national-security concern?
• What safeguards would make such decisions reviewable?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can protect continuity of essential services while respecting legal limits and institutional roles.

How to take it

Start with life and safety, using the district administration’s own emergency coordination capacity. Do not promise to override financial or regulatory processes for a trusted NGO. End with a documented, non-discriminatory plan to map services, mobilise lawful alternatives and communicate with the competent authority.

A strong answer sounds like

My first responsibility would be to ensure that relief does not stop for affected people. I would quickly map what functions the NGO was performing, such as community outreach, shelters, supplies or specialised support, and arrange lawful alternatives through district departments, local bodies, recognised relief channels and other capable organisations. I would not try to bypass the funding rules simply because the NGO has a good reputation; that would create a precedent and weaken due process. The genuine counter-argument is that administrative substitution can be slower and less trusted than a local organisation. That is precisely why preparedness and a directory of verified partners matter. My administrative judgement would be to separate urgent service continuity from the NGO’s regulatory case, document both, and pursue each through the proper channel.

Expect next

• Would you allow the NGO to use existing material stocks?
• How would you prevent favouritism among relief organisations?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can handle a genuine value conflict without presenting either sovereignty or liberty as absolute.

How to take it

Reject the forced binary while clearly explaining the state’s protective duty. Acknowledge that international links can bring expertise and solidarity, but that domestic democratic legitimacy cannot be outsourced. Land on citizen-centred accountability: transparent funding, local relevance and independent rule-based oversight.

A strong answer sounds like

I would not place them in a simple hierarchy because both sovereignty and freedom of association protect citizens. Sovereignty means that public priorities and democratic decision-making should not be quietly shaped by unaccountable external interests. Freedom of association means citizens should be able to organise, collaborate and seek lawful support for causes they consider important. International partnerships can bring expertise, research and humanitarian capacity, so shutting them out by default would make India less open and less capable. But the strongest concern is real: funding can carry influence without open public debate. I would therefore favour a framework that demands transparency, traceability and local accountability, while avoiding a presumption that cross-border cooperation is inherently suspect. Administratively, legitimacy comes from consistent rules, not selective permission.

Expect next

• Who should decide whether a cause has sufficient local relevance?
• Can transparency alone address unequal influence?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can distinguish regulation of a technology from a broader framework of safety, accountability and geopolitics.

How to take it

Begin by defining AI governance as the rules, institutions and practices governing the design, deployment and use of AI. Then connect domestic concerns such as safety and accountability with cross-border concerns such as cyber risks, standards and concentration of computing capability. End by locating India as both a large user and an aspiring producer of AI.

A strong answer sounds like

I would define AI governance as the framework that makes AI systems safe, accountable and socially useful across their full life cycle, from development to deployment and redress. It is international because models, data flows, chips, cloud infrastructure, cyberattacks and digital platforms do not respect borders. The U.S. seeking dialogue with China shows that even strategic rivals have an interest in preventing uncontrolled risks. The strongest counter-view is that early rules can slow innovation and leave India dependent on foreign firms. That risk is real, so regulation should be proportionate and should not become a licence-permit system. My administrative judgement would be to build domestic capability while insisting on risk-based safeguards, transparency and clear responsibility for harmful deployment.

Expect next

• Should India copy the regulatory model of the U.S. or China?
• Who should be legally responsible when an AI system causes harm?

What they are testing

The panel is testing your judgement when precaution, innovation, strategic competition and enforceability pull in different directions.

How to take it

Take a qualified position rather than accepting either an unconditional pause or a race without safeguards. Acknowledge that a blanket slowdown is difficult to define and verify, especially when countries distrust one another. Support common safety commitments, testing norms and communication channels instead.

A strong answer sounds like

I would not support an open-ended, blanket global slowdown agreement unless it is precisely defined, independently verifiable and applied fairly. Otherwise, responsible countries may restrain themselves while opaque actors continue, creating both a security and competitiveness problem. The concern behind such proposals is nevertheless valid: systems with serious cyber or other high-impact capabilities should not be released casually. So I would favour internationally shared thresholds for rigorous evaluation, incident reporting and dialogue among major AI powers. India should participate actively because rules made only by technologically dominant states may not reflect the needs of developing societies. My administrative judgement is to prefer enforceable safety obligations around high-risk capabilities over an unenforceable slogan of stopping AI altogether.

Expect next

• How would you verify whether another country is complying?
• Would India accept inspections of its own AI facilities?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can translate global debate into practical public administration rather than offer only abstract principles.

How to take it

Lead with the principle that AI should assist accountable public officials, not replace responsibility. Explain that deployment must follow a defined public purpose, evaluation and human review, particularly where citizens' entitlements or liberty are affected. Concede that excessive process can delay useful services, then favour phased deployment and auditability.

A strong answer sounds like

If I were responsible for a department, I would treat AI as decision support, not as a substitute for public accountability. Before deployment, I would define the public purpose, test the system on relevant conditions, identify foreseeable harms and ensure that an authorised officer can review and override an output. A citizen affected by an AI-assisted decision must know the basis of the decision and have a workable grievance route. The counter-argument is that these safeguards can make public systems slower and reduce the efficiency gains that AI promises. But speed without correction can scale exclusion or error very quickly. My administrative judgement would be to begin with limited, auditable pilots and expand only after independent evaluation and demonstrated public benefit.

Expect next

• Would you permit AI to reject a welfare application automatically?
• How will a district office audit a vendor’s proprietary model?

What they are testing

The panel is testing how you balance liberty, openness and innovation against prevention of serious misuse.

How to take it

State that restrictions may be justified for demonstrably high-risk capability, but access controls must be lawful, necessary and reviewable. Recognise the danger of censorship, surveillance and barriers that favour large firms. Land on differentiated access and due process, rather than broad bans.

A strong answer sounds like

I think some restrictions can be justified where a tool presents a credible and serious risk of cyber misuse or other substantial harm, but the state should not use safety as a vague reason to control knowledge or dissent. A broad ban would be easy to misuse, could entrench large companies that alone retain access, and may deprive students, researchers and smaller innovators of opportunity. At the same time, pretending that every capability should be released without safeguards is not a liberty-based position; it ignores the rights of people who may be harmed. I would support differentiated access, transparent legal criteria and independent review of restrictions. My administrative judgement is that openness should be the default, with narrowly tailored controls for clearly evidenced high-risk uses.

Expect next

• Who decides what counts as a high-risk capability?
• Could such controls disadvantage Indian startups against global firms?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can separate a technological process from the legal and administrative decision to grant welfare.

How to take it

Begin by define the three terms plainly and show that they should not be conflated. Acknowledge that authentication can improve database quality, but stress that it is evidence for administration, not the sole definition of entitlement. End with a human-reviewed, accessible process for exceptions.

A strong answer sounds like

I would distinguish the three clearly. Identification establishes who a person is, authentication verifies that claim at a particular time, and eligibility determines whether that person should receive a benefit under the scheme. eKYC belongs mainly to the authentication and database-updation space; it should not automatically become a final test of whether a household deserves access. The strongest argument for strict verification is that welfare systems must prevent duplication and diversion, and I agree that public money needs safeguards. But a technical non-completion may arise from access, documentation or service-delivery barriers. My administrative judgement would be to use eKYC to improve records while ensuring that a genuine household has a simple assisted route to resolve its case without abruptly losing meaningful access.

Expect next

• Would an assisted route not become a channel for fraud?
• Who should decide whether a failed authentication is genuine?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can take a balanced position under a policy trade-off rather than offering a reflexively pro-technology or anti-technology answer.

How to take it

Take a conditional position, rather than rejecting verification itself. Recognise the state’s interest in accurate targeting and accountability, then assess proportionality of the consequence for non-compliance. Land on phased enforcement with notice, assistance and review.

A strong answer sounds like

I support verification in principle, but I would question an approach in which non-completion of eKYC quickly translates into a materially worse outcome for a household. The reported condition is significant because the alternative is smaller refills at market prices. The best case for the policy is that a clear deadline may encourage updating and help the administration identify inaccurate records. That concern is legitimate. However, a deadline is fair only when every affected household has had a realistic opportunity to comply and to correct an error. I would prefer a phased approach: wide communication, local assistance, a reasonable resolution window and a recorded review mechanism. My judgement is that welfare integrity and inclusion must operate together; efficiency cannot be purchased by excluding the person the scheme is meant to serve.

Expect next

• How long should a resolution window remain open?
• Would you retain the market-price consequence after repeated reminders?

What they are testing

The panel is testing whether you can convert a broad rights-and-technology debate into practical field administration.

How to take it

Lead with fact-finding and continuity of essential service, not an announcement. Describe a short operational response involving distributors, local officials and grievance tracking, without inventing scheme rules. Conclude with feedback to the higher department based on verified patterns.

A strong answer sounds like

My first task would be to establish the nature and scale of the problem, because complaints may reflect lack of awareness, failed eKYC, incorrect records or a local delivery bottleneck. I would ask the district administration to map complaints through LPG distributors and local field channels, identify vulnerable clusters, and organise assisted verification support where people can actually reach it. I would also insist on a clear acknowledgement and tracking system so that a household is not sent repeatedly from one office to another. The counter-argument is that local relaxation can dilute a uniform national system and create discretion. Therefore, I would not improvise eligibility rules; I would document cases, act within authorised procedures and promptly seek clarification from the competent department. My administrative priority would be continuity, transparency and rapid correction of genuine exclusion.

Expect next

• How will you prevent distributors from manipulating complaint records?
• What would you report to the State government after one week?

What they are testing

The panel is testing your understanding of dignity, proportionality and state responsibility when technology mediates access to essential support.

How to take it

Avoid portraying verification as inherently unethical or beneficiaries as presumptively fraudulent. Frame the ethical test around proportionality, accessibility and remedy. Concede fiscal responsibility, then make the state responsible for designing a process that people can realistically use.

A strong answer sounds like

I would say it is ethical to verify claims, but it is not ethical to design verification as a barrier that falls most heavily on people with the least capacity to navigate it. The state has a duty to protect public resources, and ignoring false or duplicate claims would itself be unfair to taxpayers and genuine beneficiaries. Yet the state has greater power, information and technical capacity than an individual household. Therefore, the burden of making authentication workable must primarily rest on the administration, not on the beneficiary alone. A person should be informed, assisted, heard when there is a failure, and offered a timely remedy. In my view, dignity means that a technical process cannot become an opaque punishment. My administrative judgement is to retain verification but build it around accessible alternatives and accountable grievance redressal.

Expect next

• Does dignity require offline access in every welfare programme?
• How would you balance privacy with the need for verification?